I explore some new directions—suggested by feminism—for medical ethics and for philosophical ethics generally. Moral philosophers need to confront two issues. The first is deciding which moral issues merit attention. Questions which incorporate the perspectives of women need to be posed—e. g., about the unequal treatment of women in health care, about the roles of physician and nurse, and about relationship issues other than power struggles. “Crisis issues” currently dominate medical ethics, to the neglect of what I call “housekeeping issues.” (...) The second issue is how philosophical moral debates are conducted, especially how ulterior motives influence our beliefs and arguments. Both what we select—and neglect—to study as well as the “games” we play may be sending a message as loud as the words we do speak on ethics. (shrink)

I explore some new directions-suggested by feminism-for medical ethics and for philosophical ethics generally. Moral philosophers need to confront two issues. The first is deciding which moral issues merit attention. Questions which incorporate the perspectives of women need to be posed-e.g., about the unequal treatment of women in health care, about the roles of physician and nurse, and about relationship issues other than power struggles. "Crisis issues" currently dominate medical ethics, to the neglect of what I call "housekeeping issues." The (...) second issue is how philosophical moral debates are conducted, especially how ulterior motives influence our beliefs and arguments. Both what we select-and neglect-to study as well as the "games" we play may be sending a message as loud as the words we do speak on ethics. (shrink)

Open-uterine surgery to repair spina bifida, or ‘fetal surgery of open neural tube defects,’ has generated questions throughout its history—and continues to do so in a variety of contexts. As clinical ethics consultants who worked (Mark J. Bliton) and trained (Virginia L. Bartlett) at Vanderbilt University—where the first successful cases of open-uterine repair of spina bifida were carried out—we lived with these questions for nearly two decades. We worked with clinicians as they were developing and offering the procedure, with (...) researchers in refining and studying the procedure, and with pregnant women and their partners as they considered whether to undergo the procedure. From this experience in the early studies at Vanderbilt, we learned that pregnant women and their partners approach the clinical uncertainty of such a risky procedure with a curious and unique combination of practicality, self-reflection, fear, and overwhelming hope. These early experiences were a major contributing factor to the inclusion of an ethics-focused interview in the informed consent process for the Management of Myelomeningocele Study (MOMS) trial study design. (shrink)

There have been major developments in the understanding of children’s nonhuman concepts, particularly God concepts, within the past two decades, with a body of cross-cultural studies accumulating. Relatively less research has studied those of non-Christian faiths or children’s concepts of popular occult characters. This paper describes two studies, one in Spain and one in England, examining 5- to 10-year-olds’ human and nonhuman agent beliefs. Both settings were secular, but the latter comprised a Muslim majority. Children were given a false-belief task (...) in which they were asked to infer about three humans, three animals and three supernatural beings. Similar false beliefs about humans, with subtle differences in inferences about animals and supernatural beings, were found between the two locations. In London different patterns for God between participants with a family religion, in particular Muslims, and non-affiliates, were identified as well as an association between religious beliefs and practice and inferences about God. Findings are discussed in the light of theory and research on the role of sociocultural inputs in children’s theory of mind development and understanding of agency. (shrink)

It has been observed that some groups in society tend to report their health to be better than would be expected through more objective measures. The available evidence suggests that while variations in self-assessed measures of health may act as good proxies of mortality and morbidity in homogeneous populations, in some groups, such as the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities of Australia, these subjective measures may provide a misleading picture. Useful insights into the formation of health perceptions can be (...) drawn from a range of disciplines, in particular, from social comparison theories, models of illness behaviour, survey literature and linguistics. These theories and models help to provide an understanding of the different ways in which illness may be perceived, evaluated and acted upon by different kinds of people. Such considerations can have very direct implications for those planning and evaluating public health programs as well as those responsible for funding such programs. (shrink)

Bruno and Arora (2018) present a range of important ethical issues emerging from the development of procedures for uterine transplant (UT). They approach those issues by drawing on parallels to oth...

Despite increased attention to the question of how best to evaluate clinical ethics consultations and emphasis on external evaluation, there has been little sustained focus on how we, as clinicians, make sense of and learn from our own experiences in the midst of any one consultation. Questions of how we evaluate the request for, unfolding of, and conclusion of any specific ethics consultation are often overlooked, along with the underlying question of whether it is possible to give an accurate account (...) of clinical ethics consultants’ experience as experienced by ethics consultants. Before the challenge of submitting one’s accounts or case reports for review and evaluation from others, there is an underlying challenge of understanding and evaluating our own accounts. To highlight this crucial and deeply challenging dimension of actual clinical ethics practice, we present an account of a complex consultation, explicitly constructed to engage the reader in the unfolding experience of the consultant by emphasizing the multiple perspectives unfolding within the consultant’s experience. Written in script format, the three perspectives presented—prototypical clinically descriptive account; didactically reflective and self-evidentiary account often seen in journal presentations; highly self-critical reflective account emphasizing uncertainties inherent to clinical ethics practice—reflect different manners for responding to the ways actual clinical involvement in ethics consultation practice accentuates and refocuses the question of how to understand and evaluate our own work, as well as that of our colleagues. (shrink)

Since the concept of the living wills emerged nearly 50 years ago, there have been practical challenges in translating the concept of an advance directive into documents that are clinically useful across various healthcare settings and among different patient populations and cultures. Especially, challenging has been the reliance in most ADs on pre-selected “choices” about specific interventions which either revolve around broad themes or whether or not to utilize particular interventions, both of which about most laypersons know little and, more (...) importantly, lacking context, prove to be of limited meaningfulness. Moreover, whether by foundational frame, decade-long misunderstanding in medicine and bioethics, or different societal customs, these ADs present decision-making responsibility for initiating, continuing, or withdrawing medical interventions as a patient responsibility—creating a burden for which most patients are unprepared—and hence reducing healthcare providers’ responsibility to mere technical application or customer service. At our institution, significant efforts have focused on embracing the unique and complementary responsibilities of patients and physicians for enabling appropriate plans of care. This includes re-structuring our AD form to more accurately represent patient’s values as the frame within which physicians are responsible for determining appropriate care. Rather than specifying interventions, the AD makes patients responsible for specifying what matters to them as well as what they value in terms of function, interaction, and level of acceptable burden, thus providing clear goals for clinicians to pursue—or when goals are not reachable by available medical interventions, to acknowledge and allow for logical shifts to what may be achieved, including, in end of life contexts, care focused on respect and dignity. (shrink)

“If philosophy is essentially this activity of questioning and responding, that is, dialogue…” ∼ R.M. Zaner (The Way of Phenomenology)“Not to philosophize is to philosophize still.” E. Lévinas (“Go...

Against the background assumptions that knowing what clinical ethics consultation represents to those with whom ethics consultants work most closely is a necessary component for being responsible in the practice of ethics consultation, and the complexities of soliciting and understanding colleague evaluations require another inherent responsibility for the methods by which ethics consultations are evaluated, in this article we report our experience soliciting, analyzing, and trying to understand retrospective evaluations of our Clinical Ethics Consultation Service. These evaluations were collected through (...) a quality assessment effort at our institution. Drawing from the qualitative elements of our survey instrument, we describe unexpected variations among the requests for ethics consultation and the retrospective reports from those colleagues making the requests. Focusing on just one aspect – the reason for request – raised several core questions about how we should evaluate those retrospective reports, what could be learned from the differences that we were now encountering, and what we could learn about the process of evaluating our practices. Working through these questions, we suggest several issues to consider in ongoing efforts to describe and evaluate clinical ethics consultation: the role of time and memory in evaluating retrospective evaluations, the importance of attending to the language of moral shift or disruption with which our colleagues describe their experiences, and how to understand the role of ethics consultation in creating ‘moral space’ for colleagues to process their moral experiences. (shrink)

Abstract:The term “soul” is found throughout John Dewey’s work, particularly when discussing self-realization and meaningfulness. Soul can be easily associated with religious connotations, and yet it is well accepted that he did not imply such. So, then, what did he mean? In his early writings, he shifted away from theologically inspired language and toward a conception composed in naturalized terms. This, no doubt, can be confusing to uninitiated readers. While extensive analyses have been written on his philosophy of spirit and (...) metaphysics, they can leave one wondering: what is a conception of soul that is consistent with Dewey’s philosophy of experience and education, and how might it be made accessible to students in teacher preparation programs? The key for understanding this concept exists in his early work, but the characteristics need to be drawn out so they can be read more clearly into his later works. This article provides an analysis of (1) four of his early works and (2) scholarly explications on the subject in order to lay a framework for a Deweyan conception of soul as conceived within the individual, psycho-physiological makeup. (shrink)

Voici le texte de la circulaire que les organisateurs de cette manifestation viennent de lancer. Nous prions ceux de nos lecteurs qui désirent de plus amples renseignements de s'adresser aux secrétaires, MM. Ch. Perelman et A. De Waehens .Monsieur et cher collègue, La Société belge de philosophie et la Société philosophique de Louvain organisent de concert cette année, à Bruxelles et Louvain, le.

Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 43-46.

Clinical ethics consultants (CECs) work in complex environments ripe with multiple types of expectations. Significantly, some are due to the perspectives of professional colleagues and the patients and families with whom CECs consult and concern how CECs can, do, or should function, thus adding to the moral complexity faced by CECs in those particular circumstances. We outline six such common expectations: Ethics Police, Ethics Equalizer, Ethics Superhero, Ethics Expediter, Ethics Healer or Ameliorator, and, finally, Ethics Expert. Framed by examples of (...) requests for ethics consultation that illustrate each kind, along with brief descriptions, we argue that while these expectations ought to be resisted for clear and practical reasons, they also create opportunities for CECs to articulate, educate, and ultimately be responsible to the professional demands of clinical ethics work. Recognizing, acknowledging, and at times resisting those expectations thus become key activities and responsibilities in the performance of ethics consultation. (shrink)

Furthermore, adults with decision-making capacity, including pregnant women, can currently accept interventions with moderate net risks for themselves in other settings (e.g., open f...

The overlap between virtue epistemology and the philosophy of education has been dominated by discussions of the epistemic qualities of good learners, that is, the intellectual virtues that must be nurtured in students. Not much has been said about the epistemic qualities of good teachers expressed in virtue-theoretic terms. This paper offers a preliminary account of such qualities, which are designated as pedagogical virtues. I use Battaly's pluralist conception of intellectual virtue as a starting point, then describe a pedagogical virtue (...) as an intellectual virtue with an other-regarding success or motivational component. I end with an elucidation of the pedagogical versions of two mainstream intellectual virtues, perseverance and inquisitiveness. (shrink)

Intellectual character education has been primarily expressed in terms of educating for intellectual virtues (EFIV). This aim of teaching intellectual virtues has received some challenges, such as how it fails to articulate adequate action guidance through exemplarist pedagogy, and how it neglects the pervasiveness of intellectual vice among students. To respond to these challenges, this paper considers the aim of educating against intellectual vices (EAIV) – teaching students not to develop intellectual vices or weakening those that they have already developed (...) – which comes with the emergence of vice epistemology. More specifically, I look at how negative epistemic exemplars can be used as a classroom strategy for EAIV, and demonstrate how this could address the aforementioned weaknesses of EFIV. (shrink)

Presents the discovery that Hobbes was a shareholder in both the Virginia Company and its sister organization, the Somer Islands Company. He was granted a share in the former by his employer, William Cavendish in 1622, and attended its meetings regularly over the following two years. The essay explores the internal politics of the Virginia Company during this period and discusses the ways in which Hobbes may have been influenced by this experience.

There’s something paradoxical with a person saying ‘I am humble’; it doesn’t seem so humble to self-attribute humility in general, and intellectual humility in particular. In light of the recent interest in educating for intellectual virtues, this paradox has interesting implications to educating for intellectual humility. In particular, one might wonder how a teacher can be a model of intellectual humility to her students. If a teacher says something like ‘Here’s me being an exemplar of intellectual humility’, the paradox above (...) takes on a pedagogical angle. In this paper, I analyze the paradoxes in self-attributing and learning intellectual humility using three different accounts of this virtue, before proceeding to untangle what could be called the ‘Modeling Paradox’ of teaching intellectual humility and figure out whether this virtue can be non-problematically demonstrated to one’s students. (shrink)

Mathematical apriorists usually defend their view by contending that axioms are knowable a priori, and that the rules of inference in mathematics preserve this apriority for derived statements—so that by following the proof of a statement, we can trace the apriority being inherited. The empiricist Philip Kitcher attacked this claim by arguing there is no satisfactory theory that explains how mathematical axioms could be known a priori. I propose that in analyzing Ernest Sosa’s model of intuition as an intellectual virtue, (...) we can construct an “intuition–virtue” that could supply the missing explanation for the apriority of axioms. I first argue that this intuition–virtue qualifies as an a priori warrant according to Kitcher’s account, and then show that it could produce beliefs about mathematical axioms independent of experience. If my argument stands, this paper could provide insight on how virtue epistemology could help defend mathematical apriorism on a larger scale. (shrink)

Pritchard defends virtue epistemology from epistemic situationism by appealing to the notion of epistemic dependence: if knowledge acquisition is sometimes allowed to depend on factors outside the cognitive agency of the subject, then this modest form of virtue epistemology escapes the threat of the situationist challenge. This lowering of the threshold of cognitive agency required for knowledge raises the question of how to demarcate between acquisitions of true belief influenced by situational factors that count as knowledge, and those that do (...) not. I fill this gap by proposing that the dependence of knowledge acquisition on external factors comes in degrees, which allows us to look for a right degree of epistemic dependence such that it both agrees with the situationist research and preserves the normative appeal of virtue epistemology. (shrink)

The city-province distinction is usually construed in economic terms: the city is the center of consumption and wealth, while the province the center of production and raw materials. In this paper, I propose that we can also draw the distinction epistemologically; instead of distinguishing between city-dwellers and provincedwellers, we can talk about city-minded and province-minded people. In this perspective, we discover the crucial position of education as the paradoxical interplay of the city mentality and province mentality. After examining this “paradox (...) of education” as witnessed in Philippine history, especially during the Spanish and American occupations, I suggest that we can resolve the paradox by developing our system of education towards a more “nationalistic education,” as per Renato Constantino. (shrink)

(2003). Ethical and Professional Demands for Forensic Mental Health Professionals in the Post-Atkins Era. Ethics & Behavior: Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 3-9.